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This article takes Bolivia as a case in point to reflect upon the dilemmas and challenges that social movements 
find themselves confronted with once they, and in particular the party/movement coalition representing their 
grievances and demands, win power. The point to be made is that a fissure between the governing faction or 
party of the victorious movements and the remaining constituting movements is inevitable, not so much 
because of “moderation” of the former, but because governing responsibility will make this faction or party 
abandon its movement characteristics. After some brief theoretical explorations, the process of constructing 
the movements and the candidacy of left-wing indigenous President Evo Morales and his MAS party is 
addressed. The subsequent section presents a discussion of the new challenges faced by MAS after it assumed 
power, and the doubts, actions, and new “status” of the social movements that back MAS under the current 
administration. The point is made that a drifting apart inevitably occurred between MAS as governing party and 
the social movements behind it, because governing is accompanied by obligations that the movements can 
afford to disregard. The article ends with a discussion of the issues raised in it. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The thesis to be addressed in this article is that, in the 
case of outright victory for a social movement or group of  
 
 
 
ABBREVIATIONS: CIDOB, ‘Confederación de Pueblos 
Indígenas del Oriente’, confederation of indigenous people from 
the east; COB, ‘Central Obrera Boliviana’, national trade 
union federation; CONALDE, ‘Consejo Nacional Democrático’, 
national democratic council; CONAMAQ,‘Consejo Nacional de 
Ayllus y Markas del Qullasuyu’, national council of indigenous 
hamlets and administrative units of the former south-eastern 
quarter (Collasuyu) of the four quarters of the Inca Empire or 
Tawantinsuyu; COR, ‘Central Obrera Regional’; regional (El 
Alto) trade union federation; CPESC, ‘Coordinadora de Pueblos 
Étnicos del Oriente’, coordination of indigenous peoples from 
the east; CSUTCB, ‘Confederación Única de Trabajadores 
Campesinos de Bolivia’, Bolivian confederation of peasant 
workers; FEJUVE, ‘Federación de Juntas de Vecinos’, 
federation of neighborhood councils; MAS, ‘Movimiento al 
Socialismo’,  movement toward socialism; MST,‘Movimiento sin 
Tierra’, movement of landless peasants 
NEP, New Economic Policy – implemented in Bolivia as from 
1985; PNUD, ‘Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el 
Desarrollo’, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 
social movements combined with an institutional 
(democratic) continuity, the movement (s) will split into 
two factions. One faction, which will often take the form of 
a political party, will have the additional concern of 
governing and upholding democratic arrangements, while 
the other faction will continue to pressure for the 
categorical deliverance of the movements’ program. The 
precise balance between these two factions will depend 
on the radicalism of the movements’ agenda, especially 
with regard to the reform of state institutionality, the 
“statesmanship” assumed by the governing coalition, and 
on more contingent factors like the strength of 
oppositional forces, the presence or absence of an ethnic 
antagonism, and international pressure. 
Specific circumstances will, of course, make crucial 
differences. In cases in which the challenger’s victory 
came with a complete overhaul of institutionality, 
developments will often take a genuine revolutionary turn. 
In countries like Iran (1979), Zimbabwe (1980), 
Nicaragua (1979), and East Timor (2002), the change 
was violent and the conflict was of a “us or them” nature. 
Nearly all institutions collapsed. Because of the practical 
absence of the former ruler’s voice and influence after  
  
 
 
victory, the situation was characterized by the need to 
build a completely new state apparatus, and even a new 
country. The case of South Africa (1994) is unique in the 
sense that the change was, eventually, a negotiated one, 
but it was accompanied by a radical transformation of the 
system of democracy and governance.  
Our concern here is with cases in which a major 
political shift went together with a large degree of 
continuity in the foundations of the state – and confining 
ourselves to, by and large, democratic states. In Brazil 
(2002), for instance, the PT victory was characterized by 
a long run-up episode and the inheritance of an intact 
state institutionality – and complicated by the lack of a 
majority in parliament. Finding itself in this quandary, it is 
no surprise that the PT government soon disillusioned the 
movements that had celebrated its victory. The author 
suggest that this is not only because of its inability to 
push through everything it once dreamed of (due to its 
minority handicap), but also because, once in 
government, it had to comply with rules and obligations 
that the movements – primarily interest promoters – could  
simply discard. Guaranteeing democratic mores is one of 
those obligations.  
Here, it is Bolivia that will interest us. The country is a 
fascinating case in point to reflect upon when trying to 
understand the dynamics of the mix of a far-reaching 
political renovation effort and the permanence of the 
democratic institutions. This is especially the case 
because Bolivia’s 2005 political revolution (which had a 
long run-up) was characterized on the one hand by a 
peaceful electoral process and institutional continuity, but 
on the other hand by the explicit desire of the new power 
holders and many of their supporting movements to “re-
found” the country. Although the democratic legacy was 
the vehicle that had brought about the possibility to make 
this change, it was also one of the main points of 
contention the movements had rallied about. Apart from 
socio-economic issues, the goal was therefore not to 
abrogate democracy but to extend and deepen it, and to 
make it fit better in the specific ethno-cultural universe 
that they claimed Bolivia to be. Thus, from the outset, 
Bolivia’s change was marked by two goals: To defend the 
rights and guarantees that are part and parcel of the 
liberal democracy and that had allowed for the space to 
win a resounding electoral victory, and simultaneously to 
“redo” this democracy because it stood for the injustices 
the movements felt had been done to them in the past. 
What happened in Bolivia in December 2005? 
Indigenous presidential candidate Evo Morales, 
spokesman for many of the grievances a broad range of 
social movements in Bolivia had rallied about for years, 
won a landslide victory in the election (and went on to do 
even better in the December 2009 election). Ever since 
his inauguration in early 2006, the movements that 
supported his candidacy have been looking for a new role  
 
 
 
 
 
 
and presence in developments in the country. Other 
movements that oppose his plans have also emerged.1 
Morales’s victory was unprecedented in several ways. 
First, the 2005 election signaled the end of the “old” party 
system, in which a relatively small number of established 
parties, occasionally supported by more volatile ones, 
had time and again formed a coalition. The system 
demonstrated a petty intra-party and inter-party logic and 
the inability to really make links with society. Political 
parties were absorbed in the internal and mutual squaring 
of accounts, in recruiting their cadres from 
unrepresentative population sectors (Lucero, 2008: 37 
and following), and in ‘welcoming’ new political 
contenders with chicanery. Thousands of Bolivians felt 
that their interests and problems were hardly ever 
reflected in the government’s decisions or parliamentary 
deliberations (Albó and Barrios, 1993: 146-148; Salman, 
2007, Koonings and Mansilla, 2004; Crabtree and 
Whitehead, 2001: 218; Gray-Molina 2001: 63). Although 
the level of trust in politicians and parties is traditionally 
low in Latin America (Camp, 2001), it reached dramatic 
depths in Bolivia (Latinobarómetro, 2004, Salman, 
20072). The victory of MAS (‘Movimiento al Socialismo’) 
was one in which a “consolidated” but failing and inept 
party system (to be elaborated upon below) was crushed. 
Instead, the “movement party” (Zegada et al., 2008, 
‘passim’) – MAS – assumed power. But the minority 
sectors that had been represented by the old polity had of 
course not disappeared.  
Second, and often highlighted, was the first time that a 
candidate of indigenous descent had won the presidency 
of Bolivia. It confirmed the emancipation processes that 
had taken place in earlier decades. The awakening 
indigenous self-awareness of Bolivia’s majority, which 
was facilitated in a paradoxical way by the “un-
traditionalizing” shifts in indigenous habitat and access to 
city life, contributed to an increasing awareness of the 
systematic exclusion of indigenous representation from 
the hitherto subsequent governing coalitions.  
Third and closely related to the previous point, a novel 
political configuration emerged from the frustration with 
the defective party system, the indigenous exclusion, and 
the neoliberal policies that had been pursued in the 
country since 1985 (again issues to be elaborated 
below). The criticism combined ethnic ingredients 
referring to governing ethics (promoting alleged 
indigenous traditions, such as subservient authorities, 
continuous deliberation, and close contact with the 
community as a whole), with ingredients alluding to the  
                                                 
notes 
1
 There is quite a bit of debate about whether only subaltern groups, or also 
elites, can make up “social movements.” In this text, “social movements” is 
used for both types.  
2
 In a 1990 survey by Latinobarómetro (2004), 77% of Bolivians expressed the 
conviction that political parties do not work for the good of the country and 
merely defend group interests. In most other Latin American countries, small 
majorities had confidence in the good intentions of political parties. 
 
  
 
 
ideological rejection of “Western” greed, of indifference 
toward the environment and ‘Pachamama’, of rejecting 
the selling-out of national sovereignty (Albro, 2005: 445-
448), and of profit above well-being (‘vivir bien’; “living 
well” instead of “getting more and more”). The revival of 
indigenous self-awareness thus merged with a criticism 
of “white” imperialism and of harsh, neoliberal capitalism. 
It made the political shift more than a routine exchange of 
power positions and a change in ideology: This was, in 
the words of MAS supporters, a “revolution.” 
Fourth, and most important for our argument, one of 
the main reasons Morales’s victory was possible is that a 
sustained and massive series of protests had 
delegitimized and dented the incumbent party system 
and electoral system, and had stressed the themes that 
many Bolivians were concerned or angry about, namely 
indigenous exclusion, neoliberalism, privatizations, the 
“dumping” of the country’s natural resources, the lack of 
economic growth and employment, and what was 
perceived as a “treacherous democracy.” Evo Morales’s 
party (MAS) managed in 2005 to bring together many of 
these grievances in a credible electoral alternative. 
Several movements had joined forces in building the 
party, while others supported it and yet others critically 
sympathized with it. These movements now shifted 
positions from, as they are often coined, “challengers” to 
“members” (Tilly, 1978; McAdam et al., 2001). 
Simultaneously, new movements emerged to challenge 
the Morales government. Hence, not only the political and 
polity make-up, but also the social movement landscape 
in Bolivia underwent radical change. 
The author argued that is it indeed an intricate matter 
for social movements to recreate their role once they 
have won their political fight and face the challenge of 
realizing their ideals – and now belong to the ruling 
group, ‘el oficialismo’, as it is most often called in Latin 
America. MAS is a peculiar entity in this respect: It is both 
a political party and the umbrella movement of many of 
the protest movements of 2000 to 2005. In a way, the 
government of Bolivia is itself “movementist” (Albro, 
2005: 440; Zegada et al., 2008). More in particular, the 
author looked at the issue of the balancing act between 
those parts of the movements that have become the 
ruling apparatus, and the movements that remained 
movements, fostering the interests of their “social bases.” 
The author also looked at the opposition movements and 
addresses their strategies and actions, particularly in 
relation to the attitudes of the government-supporting 
movements. However, the author mainly analyze how a 
rift emerged between the MAS-supporting movements 
that continued as movements (fighting for substantial 
changes and relatively indifferent to the vicissitudes of 
opponents or the nation-state as such), and MAS as 
governing party, unwilling and unable to be completely 
unconcerned about the sectors that had not supported it 
and now acted as the opposition. After all, MAS was 
governing a democratic state. 
 
 
 
 
Some of the existing literature on “movement 
outcomes” and assess its applicability to the Bolivian 
case was first discussed. The genesis of MAS as a 
movementist party was then briefly sketch. In the 
subsequent section, the current situations was addressed 
and analyzed: A movementist party ruling, and dealing 
with, both its supporting and its opposing movements. In 
this setting, MAS has of course a clear sympathy for “its” 
movements and tries to push through the program that 
unites them, but at the same time, as it embodies the 
state, it is obliged to guarantee the political rights of its 
opponents. This obligation will inevitable create tensions 
between the forces that pursue “the total change,” and 
the forces that need to referee the game of realizing such 
a change amidst dissentients. Finally, the outcomes of 
the findings was discussed. 
 
 
REFLECTING UPON THE OUTCOMES OF SOCIAL 
MOVEMENT ACTIONS 
 
Efforts have been made, but not often, to reflect upon the 
outcomes of social movements. According to Cress and 
Snow (2000: 1063-1064) and (Giugni, 1998: 373), “our 
understanding of the consequences of social movements 
is conspicuously underdeveloped.” Moreover, most of the 
literature concerned with the question confines its 
explanations and conceptual propositions to situations in 
which something had been won: It is about concessions, 
about some change, about “acceptance and/or 
advantages” (Gamson, 1990; Giugni, 1998: 376), or 
about new legislation. The situation in which a full 
overhaul of the polity or political system is the outcome, is 
not often addressed (Lanegram, 1995; Zuern, 2004).  
Such views are of course helpful, as was explained 
here. This explanation, however, also will demonstrate 
the limitations of these contributions. The analyses 
discuss topics that have obvious relevance for situations 
of political renovation combined with institutional 
preservation. Cress and Snow (2000: 1098-1102), for 
instance, assert that the movement’s own characteristics, 
framing, and structures provide a more convincing cause 
for predicting outcomes (whether or not successful) than 
do the outward “conditions.” They add, however, that 
there is no singular predictor: It is the combination of 
movement characteristics and exterior condition that in 
the end helps explain the attainment of outcomes. In the 
case of Bolivia, this seems correct: It was the 
movements’ strength to frame, through MAS, their 
demands in such a way that ethnic, socio-economic, and 
political grievances could be amalgamated. However, this 
worked only in a setting in which the credibility of the 
traditional political system was largely in tatters (and thus 
an increasingly less appealing alternative) and simply not 
responsive. This led to a polarization in which the 
differences amongst the established parties became 
nearly invisible and, in the perception of many people,  
  
 
 
irrelevant, as they as a whole were identified with the full 
range of grievances that people experienced (Salman, 
2006, 2007). At the same time, the emerging alternative 
MAS came to be identified as the only candidate that 
could realize all the outcomes they desired but that were 
blocked by the establishment: Representation and 
resources for MAS, and rights and relief for its 
constituency (Cress and Snow, 2000: 1067; Córdova et 
al., 2009: 67).  
Giugni (1998) and Gamson (1990) also concentrate on 
factors that help to explain success, rather than on the 
movements’ vicissitudes after they achieved their 
substantial success. Their frameworks turn out to have 
limited value for the Bolivian case. Gamson’s emphasis 
on single-issue demands, on selective incentives, on the 
use of disruption or violence as a tactic, and on the need 
for some movement bureaucratization, centralization, and 
unity, as ingredients for success, applies only very 
partially to the Bolivian situation. MAS complied with only 
one aspect: The selective use of violence. However, its 
demands covered a host of issues; and in the case of 
MAS, the aspect of centralization and unity is an intricate 
one, a matter that was disussed. At any rate, simply 
stating that MAS was bureaucratized, centralized, and 
united is inadequate. Giugni (1998) stresses, more or 
less against Cress and Snow (2000), that there is need to 
focus on “the environmental conditions that channel their 
(the movements’) consequences” (idem: 379), and not on 
the movements’ own characteristics. He highlights public 
opinion (and points to “the fundamental role of the media” 
therein (idem: 380)) and political opportunity structures. 
Again, reflecting upon the Bolivian case, these 
suggestions result in mixed findings. On the one hand, 
obviously, in public opinion, the credibility of the old 
political party system had been rapidly dwindling since 
the 1990s. This, however, was hardly conveyed by most 
of the media in Bolivia: They were in general quite hostile 
toward Morales and MAS. As for the political opportunity 
structure, the “old” parties were no doubt in disarray. On 
the other hand, the “broad, system-wide crisis” (idem: 
380) that is allegedly a factor in the movements’ success, 
was largely produced by these movements themselves, 
through their unceasing protest rallies. And Giugni’s 
overview of possible outcomes (Gamson, 1990), which 
consists of full response, pre-emption, co-optation, and 
collapse (Giugni, 1998: 382), does not really consider the 
possibility of a full-fledged overthrow of the “old rulers.”  
The reason to refer to these contributions, even though 
they hardly touch upon the analysis of social movements 
“after complete victory,” is that they deal extensively with 
the specificities of movements’ environments and 
characteristics. These characteristics seem to be a 
crucial point of consideration if one wants to understand 
the developments ‘after’ the movements or their electoral 
representative took over, as at that moment the 
movements already have specific histories that no doubt 
inform their stances and fates after the triumph of their  
 
 
 
 
electoral flagship. One issue in particular also brought up 
by Giugni and by Cress and Snow (though they disagree 
about it), should be taken into consideration here. This is 
the issue of the relative impact of the internal and the 
external factors that influence social movement 
outcomes. They no doubt feed back upon each other. 
Exterior factors – such as a sympathetic or antagonistic 
stance on the part of the authorities, or a supportive or 
indifferent or hostile public opinion and media, or weak or 
strong governing institutions, or variations in authority’s 
tactics and levels of repression, or the presence or 
absence of mediating entities – no doubt influence 
movement characteristics and developments. On the 
other hand, however, movements’ characteristics – such 
as type and depth of the motivation of participants, the 
livelihood importance of the issues, the inclusiveness, 
coherence, simplicity, and rhetorical qualities of the 
mobilization discourse, the degree of institutionalization, 
and the willingness to “deal” with authorities and/or 
opponents – doubtlessly influence the reactions in the 
realms of public opinion and debate, media, and the 
polity, and thus the conditions under which the 
movements further evolve. It is in this balance that things 
change drastically after the movements win: From then 
on, the point of departure is a sympathetic, “soft,” ally-like 
attitude on the part of the authorities (“our people”). 
However, the point that is often overlooked is the ,change 
in position, that the movements’ uniting party (or 
“movement party” or standard-bearer) goes through after 
the victory: It changes from being a ‘demanding entity’ to 
being an implementing and, most crucially, a ‘governing’ 
entity – and that restricts its room for maneuver, and 
therefore leads to tensions with its constitutive parts.  
At any rate, these contributions tell us little about what 
is likely to happen to movements once they have 
practically ousted the forces that refused to listen to their 
demands. The analysis of processes within movements 
after they have gained victory still seems to be incipient. 
The few analyses of movements that brought “their” party 
to power generally emphasize that the relationship often 
becomes thorny or at least complicated (Bowie, 2005: 56-
59; Valente, 2008; Osava, 2006). Although on the one 
hand, a loyalty persists (partly triggered by the insight 
that political alternatives would only make things worse), 
on the other hand – and this is the crucial feature hitherto 
insufficiently theorized – a distance emerges as a result 
of the differences between the mores of governing and 
those of interest promotion. This, the author believe, is 
also why movements often face the danger of being co-
opted and thus rendered harmless, or end up constrained 
in their actions because of their wish not to destabilize 
the government (Zegada et al., 2008: 102). But the 
specific dynamics that characterize the situation after 
victory and after the movements have split into two 
factions, one of which will actually assume governance, 
while the other will allegedly continue to support the 
shared cause, have scarcely been systematically  
  
 
 
addressed.  With Bolivia as illustration, it was suggested 
that in such cases the governing responsibilities will 
weaken the movement characteristics of the governing 
faction, and thus produce tensions that will reflect 
disagreements not necessarily in terms of radicalism or 
“speed,” but in terms of ‘position’. 
Resuming, although most literature on movement 
outcomes focuses on the factors that influence these 
outcomes rather than on the post-victory situation, they 
still contribute a lot in terms of giving center stage to 
these factors as antecedents of and backdrop to the 
developments such movements will go through after their 
electoral allies or standard-bearers win. The actual 
processes after such a win, however, have not received 
much attention – and where they have, most cases 
concerned a revolutionary or military victory, not an 
electoral one. Additionally, the point most often missed in 
the cases in which such themes were addressed, was 
that the findings that highlight the growing rift between 
the governing faction and the interest-promoting faction 
of the social movements’ conglomerate, were caused not 
only by the inability to realize all the changes overnight, 
but also by changes in the role and the position of the 
governing faction. After assuming power, this faction can 
no longer focus only on the substance of the changes, 
because it must also pay attention to the procedures. The 
more radical the movements’ propositions about 
institutional change were and still are after the turn, the 
more likely it is that the governing faction will encounter 
problems in trying to combine its program with its 
governing and rights-warranting duties. This will produce 
a shift in the attitude of social movements that were once 
a pillar under the resurrectionist standard-bearer: After 
the shift they will often become, at best, an exacting 
friend.  
 
 
BOLIVIA’S TURBULENT RECENT HISTORY: THE 
RISE OF MAS AS MOVEMENT PARTY 
 
Bolivia is the poorest country in South America. It has 
barely 9 million inhabitants, of whom allegedly more than 
half are of indigenous descent (Toranzo, 2008). It has 
historically been an unstable country, undergoing a series 
of ‘coup d’états’ between 1964 and the early 1980s. Its 
governments were also characterized by a historical 
subservience to external interests and foreign powers, 
and by unequal control over the territory and the 
population (PNUD, 2007: 34-37). After suffering almost 
two decades of authoritarian rule, Bolivia restored 
democracy in 1982. The elected, left-wing government, 
however, was overwhelmed by raging inflation and the 
legacy of dictatorship, and was thus short-lived. As from 
1985, the country was ruled by a series of coalition 
governments, all of which shared the basic idea that the 
country needed “modernization” – read: A neoliberal reform 
(Klein, 1992; Kohl and Farthing, 2006). This meant an end 
to the “national development policies” that had been in 
 
 
 
 
place since the 1950s. Now a New Economic Policy 
(NEP) was proposed. The NEP consisted of the usual 
recipe to reduce the fiscal deficit, reform the monetary 
system, slim down the state bureaucracy (by means of 
massive lay-offs), liberalize markets, foster exports (mainly 
raw materials and agricultural crops), and introduce a more 
efficient tax system. It also involved an overhaul of several 
state industries, such as the state-owned mining company, 
the outcome of which was the dismissal of 23,000 miners. 
A further effect of trade liberalization was that Bolivian 
markets were flooded with cheap imported goods, which 
caused serious trouble for large and medium-sized 
factories (Kohl and Farthing, 2006). Since then, an 
estimated 65% of the Bolivian workforce has been 
unemployed, underemployed, or informally employed 
(Tokman, 2007). The trade unions have been greatly 
weakened (Lucero, 2008; García Linera et al., 2008).  
Although there were various coalitions comprising different 
parties,3 their policies were fairly consistent. The result was, 
for example, some slow, uneven, and fragile macro-
economic growth, as well as persistent poverty, high 
unemployment figures, and a lack of substantial progress in 
such areas as health care and education (the latter, 
however, made progress in the second half of the 1990s). 
Moreover, during these years there was no explicit public or 
political debate on the course of the reigning economic 
policies, or on the foreseeable effects of one or the other 
direction in managing the country’s economy (Salman, 
2006; McNeish, 2006). Electoral campaigns were vague 
and often manipulated, and although there was no large-
scale rigging of elections, there were frequent accusations 
of, for instance, using fiscal money for the canvassing of 
incumbent governing parties (Assies and Salman, 2003a). 
Moreover, party programs and campaigns often lacked any 
content-focused attempt to distinguish the party from 
political alternatives. Party differences had nothing to do 
with positions vis-à-vis policy alternatives, or with efforts to 
articulate different societal sectors, or with different interest 
patterns among the population. Campaigns were 
personalist, corporatist-clientelistic, and often demagogic. 
Tapia and Toranzo (2000: 30) criticized the country’s 
political parties for failing to be mediators or articulators  
                                                 
3
 The three main parties were the ADN, the MNR, and MIR. The AND (Acción 
Democrática Nacionalista; Nationalist Democratic Action) was a right-wing 
party founded by Hugo Banzer after he stepped down from his dictatorial seat. 
The MNR (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario; Revolutionary 
Nationalist Movement) was the party responsible for the 1952 revolution, 
which formally ended aristocratic and ethnically biased rule in the country. In 
those days, it was inspired by socialism and an egalitarian strategy 
downplaying ethnicity, but it later became more conservative and never 
managed to put an end to the exclusion of the indigenous population from 
positions of power or influence. Still, it had suffered from authoritarian 
repression in the 1970s, and Banzer’s ADN was therefore an implausible 
alliance partner. However, in practice the differences between the ADN’s 
conservatism and elitism and the MNR’s conservatism and elitism had faded 
by the mid 1980s. Finally, there was the MIR (Movimiento de la Izquierda 
Revolucionario; Movement of the Revolutionary Left ), which originally was a 
left-wing split-off from the MNR, but later turned into an opportunistic, and 
seriously corrupt election machine. This party, too, had suffered from Banzer’s 
repression, but was nevertheless willing to make a pact with the ADN.  
  
 
 
of representation. Parties were “ideologically thin 
electoral vehicles” (Lucero, 2008: 12). The most serious 
effect of this party modality was that parties could hardly 
be held accountable for their actions as governing or 
opposition parties. No political “identity” was present 
against which concrete stances could be measured; and 
the fact that this characterized parties’ performance for 
decades meant that people “unlearned” to compare 
parties’ self-presentations in terms of political differences 
and in terms of closeness to their proper interests and 
grievances (Latinobarómetro, 2004). Instead, social 
organizations (e.g., trade unions) and, increasingly, 
newer social movements (e.g., civic committees, 
federations of neighborhood councils, peasant unions, 
‘cocaleros’, and ethnic organizations) were “the primary 
organizations expressing the interests of society” 
(Gamarra and Malloy, 1995, cited by Lucero 2008: 42). 
This is not the place to go into more detail, or to sketch 
the whole sequence of coalitions, presidents, their 
policies, or the concrete measures that triggered the most 
massive protests (Assies and Salman, 2003a, 2003b; 
Salman, 2006; Crabtree, 2005). Suffice it to say that the 
protests were the cradle of the social movements that, 
eventually, helped Evo Morales to become president. It 
should be added to this that the overwhelming majority of 
these movements were active in the western highlands of 
the country, where the indigenous form a clear majority.  
The story of these movements is partly that of the 
protests. From the 1980s onward, and especially 
between 2000 and 2005, an uncountable series of 
protests characterized the country’s daily routine. By 
then, the belief in political inclusion for the subaltern and 
indigenous, and in political change through elections, had 
withered. The protests – or head-on clashes with 
governmental measures resulting from the absence of 
other credible channels to access politics – showed that 
in the eyes of many Bolivians, “democracy” was no more 
than a sham. In these years, the movements slowly came 
to embody not only the emerging societal protest against 
a unipolar (García Linera et al., 2008: 13) right-wing 
polity, but also “societal democratization machineries” 
(idem: 19). In this sense, they were the answer to an 
exclusionary political system that was unable and 
unwilling to change economic policies it considered 
beyond discussion (Assies and Salman, 2003a; McNeish, 
2006), and that was unable and unwilling to open up the 
“petrified” and dysfunctional democratic mores.  
Collective interest promotion and collective citizenship 
have traditionally been important in Bolivia (García Linera 
et al., 2008: 14). PNUD/Wanderley (2007) emphasizes 
the “communitarian” and collective strategies that are 
often applied to ensure rights, obtain benefits, and 
influence politics and political decisions. Wanderley 
connects this collective attitude to a strong tradition of 
jointly defending one’s rights and dignity. Individual rights 
and identities in Bolivia are often the result of collective 
performance (PNUD/Wanderley, 2007: 389). Contrary to  
 
 
 
 
the personal experience of vulnerability and inferiority, 
many people feel empowered and “capacitated” when 
they act in the context of collective action. García Linera 
et al. (2008: 14-16) and Dangl (2009) assert that, from 
the 1980s onward, the tradition of “functional” collective 
interest promotion (exemplified by COB, the once mighty 
national trade union federation) slowly made way for 
more territorial and cultural features. These new social 
movements gradually took over the role the old trade 
unions had played, and thus expressed the changed 
socio-economic and cultural make-up of Bolivian society, 
in which indigenous identities became increasingly 
politicized (Kruse, 2005, García Linera et al., 2008). The 
movements that emerged in the 1990s and came to full 
bloom in the years between 2000 and 2005, are the 
movements of coca-growers (Coca Trópico), the 
federation of ‘juntas de vecinos’ (FEJUVEs; 
neighborhood councils) in various cities (e.g., El Alto), the 
‘Coordinación’ of water consumers in and around 
Cochabamba and other cities, the migrating peasants 
looking for new land in the east of the country 
(Confederación de Colonizadores), the miners (both the 
salaried ones and those organized in cooperativos,which 
held mining concessions), and the indigenous 
movements like Consejo Nacional de Ayllus y Markas del 
Qullasuyu, (CONAMAQ), ‘Confederación de Pueblos 
Indígenas del Oriente’ (CIDOB), ‘Coordinadora de 
Pueblos Étnicos del Oriente’ (CPESC), and ‘Movimiento 
sin Tierra’ (MST; the landless peasants). The indigenous 
also gained prominence in their peasant-cum-ethnic 
stature, for example in ‘Confederación Única de 
Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia’ (CSUTCB; 
Confederation of Peasant Workers’ Unions of Bolivia) 
and its women’s branch, ‘Federación de Mujeres 
Campesinas Bartolina Sisa’, or recurring to their local 
organization in ‘sindicatos’ (rural unions) or ‘ayllus’, the 
traditional Andes community organizational form, which 
combines territory and symbolic kinship. Furthermore, 
there were actions by the unions of transporters and 
teachers, by health workers, by students, pensioners, 
street vendors, organizations that opposed free-trade 
treaties or other outcomes of globalization processes 
(Mayorga and Córdova, 2008), and many others. They 
not always represented consolidated social movements, 
and there was a lot of overlap between these initiatives. 
Nevertheless, they were massive protests, often street 
rallies, gatherings, ‘cabildos, (“plenary street 
demonstrations”), and as such, according to García 
Linera et al. (2008: 19), “mechanisms that were projected 
as political systems, complementary or alternative, able 
to comply more efficiently and democratically than parties 
and the ‘aggregation of wills’ through liberal 
representation” (see also Lucero, 2008). More than the 
concrete protest issue was often at stake. Protest alluded 
to a comprehensive alternative to the ruinous “liberal” 
democratic legacy. These social movements demanded 
the right to have a say in changes in this legacy. Hence,  
  
 
 
the movements began to demand that the democratic 
system undergo an encompassing transformation, 
although they never suggested abrogating the rights and 
freedoms offered by the existing democratic system. The 
memory of the era of dictatorships was a strong incentive 
for this adherence to the freedoms that come with 
democracy. As a matter of fact, the fierce criticism of the 
existing democracy was combined with pride in having 
restored democracy in the 1980s and being a democratic 
country. This characteristic, as was address below had its 
impact on how the relations between governance and 
demand-orientation later evolve. In the course of time 
many of these movements came to feel that they were to 
some extent represented in the ‘Movimiento al 
Socialismo’ (MAS), the movement/party that brought Evo 
Morales to power in 2005.  
The ‘cocaleros’ (coca-growers), and their leader Evo 
Morales, took the lead in building a political party out of 
the movements. It is therefore not surprising that the 
‘cocaleros’ now have a prominent position in MAS, and 
that Morales, being president, continues to be their 
leader. According to Zegada and colleagues (2008: 88-
91), besides the ‘cocaleros’, also the CSUTCB, CIDOB, 
‘Conferedación de Colonizadores, and ‘Federación de 
Mujeres Campesinas Bartolina Sisa’ are the ones that 
became organically integrated in the MAS apparatus. The 
authors speak of a “symbiosis” and of the co-optation of 
the leaders of these movements (idem: 88, 90), but add 
that this does not mean that these movements are a 
monolithic block. Nevertheless, it does mean that the 
leaders of these movements are very close to Morales 
and participated in strategic and tactical decision-making. 
It also means that, in mobilizations where MAS as such 
needed to be represented on the street, members of 
these movements would massively participate.  
A second circle of movements are those that are close 
to, and even linked to, MAS, but that are not part of the 
decision-making circle. They include ‘Federación de 
Juntas Vecinales de la ciudad de El Alto’ (FEJUVE) and 
‘Federación Sindical de Trabajadores Mineros de Bolivia’ 
(FSTMB; the salaried miners of Bolivia). They rallied in 
favor of MAS, they delivered substantial numbers of 
parliamentarians in the 2002, 2005 and 2009 elections, 
and they display “a critical support that would not 
generate conflicts” (idem: 92). Indicative of their 
somewhat more independent stance is that, when the 
leader of El Alto’s FEJUVE (Abel Mamani) was made 
minister in Morales’s first cabinet (it was a short-lived 
ministry, by the way), FEJUVE immediately declared that 
Mamani did not represent them as a movement (idem: 
94).  
A third circle includes the movements that support 
MAS’s project for change, in general terms. But they are 
either more radical in their leftist stances, or they want to 
defend their autonomy. They do not want to be part of 
government circles or of ‘oficialismo’. They comprise, for 
example, the local branch of COB (the national trade  
 
 
 
 
union federation): COR in the city of ‘El Alto and Consejo 
Nacional de Ayllus y Markas del Qullasuyu’ (CONAMAQ), 
a quite radically indigenist grouping of local indigenous 
organizations and associations. These movements, 
which are convinced that “generating conflicts for the 
government now would be disadvantageous for the 
interests of the popular sectors” (idem: 96), have 
abstained from mobilizing against the MAS government, 
but have publicly uttered criticisms.  
Thus at the time (that is, before December 2005), MAS 
developed as a movement party. It built up a party 
structure with a group of close friends and trustees, and 
designed the party’s political and ideological profile. But 
during this process, in particular with the movements in 
the first circle, it negotiated strategies, asked for input on 
specific political themes and areas, organized special 
meetings with a host of movements to ask for ideas and 
to adapt its political proposals, and rallied with other 
social movements on a series of occasions (Zegada et 
al., 2008: 26-45; Grey-Postero, 2009: 303; Lucero 2008: 
139-140). MAS managed to convince many movements 
because it combined framing in class and socio-
economic terms with framing in ethnic terms. It 
synthesized national-popular, leftist Marxist and 
indigenist inspirations. It represented “the popular” and 
“the indigenous,” all those suffering the consequences of 
the politics of “elites, imperialists, neoliberals, 
‘vendepatrias’” (literally “land sellers,” basically: traitors). 
Hence, a counter-discourse emerged that highlighted the 
“alternative” ways of thinking and governing in indigenous 
traditions, the ongoing exclusion of indigenous voices in 
real positions of power, the indifference toward the plight 
of the poor, and the ‘blanco-mestizo’ character of 
neoliberalism (e.g. the idea that neoliberalism somehow 
represented the Western world). This was a discourse 
that may have been “unclear in its ideological 
delineation,” but was able to become “cohesive at 
moments of confrontation with the government” (Zegada 
et al., 2008: 56-57). Additionally, a wavering attitude 
toward “formal democracy” became apparent in these 
movements: They did not defend it, but cherished its 
benefits and freedoms – and at the same time criticized it 
for its Western imprint and scarce channels for political 
participation.  
The story of the strengthening of MAS suggests that in 
the disagreement between Giugni (1998) and Cress and 
Snow (2000) on whether movement characteristics or 
environmental conditions contribute more to movement 
outcomes, neither side would be fully correct: It seems 
that it is the “fine dialectics” between the two that help 
explain the fortunes of movements. The characteristics of 
both impinge, through various mediations, upon the 
ongoing developments of both the social movement and 
the “synthesizing” electoral representative (turning into 
government). Concretely, MAS did not need a coherent 
singular discourse in order to develop into a convincing 
electoral alternative, because its opponent was in the  
  
 
 
midst of a process of disarray and disqualifying itself as 
the “gang” responsible for disaster and irresponsiveness, 
and also because MAS needed some ambiguity in its 
rhetoric in order to become authoritative for all these very 
different movements and demands (Rubin, 1998). MAS 
did, however, need a certain degree of bureaucratization 
in order to be an electoral match for the old polity. It also 
needed an “organic” link with the entire array of 
movements if it were to fulfill its role as synthesizing 
entity. But it could only flourish because of the strong 
position of the whole range of social movements. Between 
2000 and 2005, the social movements determined the 
political agenda, and to a large degree forced the ruling 
administrations to engage with the issues promoted by 
actors within these movements. MAS was responsive and, 
therefore, thrived on these waves of protests. Approaching 
the events from the other end, we see that the initial 
government’s stance whereby 
repression/negotiation/non-delivery was the order of the 
day, evolved in the course of time through an episode of 
demonizing MAS and Morales, into a stance that resulted 
in the old party system being abandoned even by the 
party dinosaurs and replaced by a new, “united” front in 
an attempt to withstand Morales’s growing popularity. In 
2005, it proved too little, too late. Hence, it is not MAS’s 
qualities alone, or the environmental features 
themselves, but the process of mutual “co-manufacturing” 
that helps to understand why the drastic political 
turnaround occurred in 2005. The main theoretical issue 
raised, however, is that of the rift that the author believed 
should occur if the movements’ victory is accompanied by 
democratic institutional continuity, and consequentially by 
an obligation of the governing faction of these 
movements to abide by the democratic mores. In such 
cases, beyond the technical, material, or political 
obstacles to realizing all the changes that were 
demanded earlier, there is the key obstacle of the new 
position the governing entity will be in: As governing 
entity, it will have to heed the procedures and regulations, 
even in its attempts to push through the proposed 
changes as fast as possible. The non-governing 
components of the whole of the movements will, because 
of their position, not have much understanding of this 
predicament – despite the fact that they will defend, in 
general terms, Bolivia as a democracy.  
 
 
AFTER THE TURN: THE COMPLEXITIES OF SOCIAL 
MOVEMENTS–MAS RELATIONSHIPS 
 
In December 2005, MAS won a landslide victory (54% of 
the votes). Since early 2006, it has been the governing 
party in Bolivia. During it first term, which ran till the end 
of 2009, it had to reckon with an oppositional majority in 
the senate (although it had a majority in the chamber of 
representatives). MAS’s most important feats of arms in 
its 2006 to 2009 term were the nationalization of the  
 
 
 
 
country’s large reserves of natural gas and other strategic 
natural resources and strategic industries, a new, 
indigenous-friendly constitution, and a series of social 
and poverty-alleviating measures.  
In the December 2010 election, MAS won 64% of the 
votes, which after the allocation of parliamentary seats 
gave it a two-thirds majority in both houses. But the 
change in Bolivia’s social movement landscape dates, of 
course, from early 2006. The constellation that emerged 
turned out to present completely new problems: While 
until 2005, the movements had been the expression of 
the broken relationship between state and civil society 
(Salman, 2006, 2007; Garciá Linera et al., 2008) and an 
incipient model for alternatives that were eventually 
embodied in MAS, they had now suddenly become, in a 
way, the government itself (Cuba Rojas, 2006) – even if 
they hardly represented any unified program. Before the 
development of the relationship between MAS and the 
social movements that backed it after it had assumed 
governing responsibilities was analyzed, there is need to 
first provide a bit of background about Bolivia’s new 
political landscape. To begin with, new social movements 
emerged immediately after the inauguration of Morales. 
The pro-MAS movements had their stronghold in the 
highlands and “indigenous” west of the country. When their 
increasingly “ethnic” framing became state policy, it 
triggered a reaction in the eastern lowlands, where 
conservative forces created a right-wing, regional, and 
increasingly anti-indigenous countermovement, which built 
upon a decade-old regionalism (Soruco et al., 2008; 
Zegada et al., 2008: 170; Roca, 2008). The lowland 
departments of Santa Cruz, Beni, Pando, and Tarija 
became known as the ‘media luna’ (“half moon”), because 
of their geographic shape. The polarization between the 
new central government and the ‘media luna’ reached its 
height in 2008, when violent attacks against MAS 
supporters in the main cities of these department became 
rampant – and MAS supporters did their share against 
oppositional demonstrations in “their territory." The nadir 
was an armed attack on a convoy of pro-MAS peasants in 
the department of Pando in September 2008, when more 
than ten were killed. 
The main natural gas reserves are in these eastern 
departments, and regional entrepreneurs succeeded in 
mobilizing the departments for more “autonomy”– which, 
according to many, was a cover-up for a counter-strategy 
aimed at attaining regional rather than national agreements 
with the transnational companies that are interested in 
exploiting the gas, and at preserving traditional elite 
privileges (Kohl and Farthing, 2006: 185; Soruco et al.,  
2008; Zegada et al., 2008: 173-176; Assies, 2006; Spronk 
and Webber, 2007: 37). They became grouped around the 
‘comites’ ‘cívicos’ of the departments and their main cities, 
and pressed for regional autonomy. In the period 2006 to 
2009, they had substantial mobilization power. Most 
observers agree that traits of racism were among the 
participants’ motives, and many condemned the flare-ups  
  
 
 
of violence that sometimes occurred during their rallies 
(Soruco et al., 2008; Assies 2006).4  
Nevertheless, a genuine, anti-government group of social 
movements emerged in the east of the country after MAS 
assumed governance. They are conspicuously absent from 
most publications, even recent ones, on “social movements 
in Bolivia” (Dangl, 2009; Mayorga and Córdova, 2008; 
García Linera et al., 2008); an exception is Zegada et al., 
(2008: 169-178). They did, however, trigger counter-
reactions by pro-MAS movements, which were sometimes 
surprised that the government would not “categorically” 
support them in their initiatives – a feature that can only be 
explained by the obligation of the government to also 
tolerate the challengers. The movements found it hard to 
understand why MAS did not simply react as a ‘movement’ 
that was diametrically opposed to and would try to crush 
these challengers.  
This development – and this is another important context 
feature – can be partly explained by a remarkable 
“semantic maneuver” by the MAS administration. Evo, 
MAS, and subsequently the media and even the 
opposition, began to refer to “the social movements” as 
though they were a clearly identifiable, addressable 
entity, namely the cluster of movements supporting the 
new administration. It is now very common to hear in 
Bolivia Evo Morales saying “I will ask the social 
movements to support the new constitution” (e.g., the 
newspaper ‘Ultimas Noticias’, 22-8-2008), to hear a 
critical journalist say “the social movements have 
hijacked Evo’s administration” (newspaper ‘La Prensa’ 
10-11-2009), to hear the opposition say “the social 
movements are Evo’s strong-arm squad” (biweekly 
‘Nueva Crónica’ 44, July 2009, 4-5), and to hear a 
spokesperson of some movement say “We, the social 
movements, will closely watch the current process” (the 
newspaper ‘La Prensa’, 6-3-2009, 13-8-2009). The social 
movements that back Evo Morales’s victory seem, as a 
whole, to have acquired a sort of legal personality. Social 
movements have thus become a very peculiar entity in 
both government and opposition discourses: They are 
now a political protagonist with a name tag, one that is 
explicitly and directly addressed by other political players 
as though it were a full-fledged interlocutor in politics. In 
the new constitution, which was approved in a  
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 In Bolivia, some, traditionally relatively innocent, animosity between the 
majority populations of the western highlands and the eastern lowlands has 
existed for a long time. The first, often labelled the Collas, are stereotyped as 
indigenous, darker-skinned, and “pre-modern;” the latter (Cambas) as taller, 
mostly descendants of European migrants, and more “entrepreneurial” (Soruco 
et al. 2008, Roca 2008, Barragán 2008, Paz Patiño et al. 2009). The Colla–
Camba opposition has acquired, especially since Morales assumed power, new 
rhetoric intensity which has polarized the country. The stereotypes applied in 
this verbal skirmish are twisted in that descendents of Spanish and European 
origin also reside in the west (and often participated enthusiastically in 
marginalizing their indigenous neighbours). Additionally, also in the east many 
different indigenous peoples traditionally have their home and large flows of 
western (Aymara and Quechua) indigenous individuals have migrated to the 
east in recent decades. Hence, the stereotypes are of course deeply wrong, but 
to a large degree, especially in recent years, “true in their consequences.” 
 
 
 
 
referendum in January 2009, an explicit and legal role 
had been formulated for the social movements. In,título 
VI, artículo 241, apartado 2’, it is stated that “organized 
civil society will control public administration at all state 
levels” (my translation). Here, social movements are not 
only recognized as legitimate defenders of interests, but 
are also integrated in the genesis of legislation and in 
state affairs in such a way that they have almost become 
a part of state institutionality. In his speeches, Evo often 
addresses the movements, soliciting them to participate 
in his administration (Mayorga, 2007). Movements are 
addressed as though they could be appointed, or at least 
called upon, for specific political goals or by specific 
political actors. The government also established 
CONALDE (Consejo Nacional Democrático), in which all 
the national movements that back the government 
allegedly unite to guarantee the administration’s position. 
This might lead one to believe that the relationship 
between the movements and MAS-as-government is as 
fluent as it, in general, was before 2005. But this idea 
neglects the fact that the position of both is now 
completely different. MAS is now the government. As the 
government, it will of course continue to pursue its ideals. 
But it also needs to “manage” the country, it needs to rule 
and monitor all state affairs, and – last but not least – it 
needs to sustain and protect the democracy and the 
liberties and rights of all Bolivian citizens. This inevitably 
limits its freedom to behave as a social movement as 
unconcernedly as it used to do. For the social 
movements behind MAS, on the other hand, as various 
authors have suggested (Tarrow, 1998, Alvarez et al., 
1998; Foweraker, 1995), it is only “natural” that they 
continue to act on their own accord, define their own 
strategy, and rally whenever they themselves deem fit. 
But their peculiar genesis and position in Bolivia, and the 
administration’s strategy, makes precisely that very 
difficult. They were one of the important vehicles for 
Morales’s journey to power, and they are now regarded 
by the government as the organic allies of the “revolution” 
that Evo embodies (Zegada et al., 2008; García Linera et 
al., 2008). Their independence during the years of 
protest, which made them natural collaborators of the 
political ambition of MAS but still autonomous in their 
decisions, has reversed and, as far as the government is 
concerned, turned them into defenders of what has now 
been achieved. As “defenders,” however, they 
simultaneously lose their independent position because 
they end up as constituent components of the incumbent 
administration, and thus stop complying with one 
“prerequisite” of being social movements; while at the 
same time they are, in a way, officially coined and 
declared “the social movements” of Bolivia. This could be 
diagnosed as a “subordination of the social movements 
to the state” (Zegada et al., 2008: 72, 100). Furthermore, 
it seems doubtful that such a situation fosters free 
internal debate and democracy within the social 
movements. That, however, is not the whole story.  
  
 
 
Although the opposition accuses the government of 
instructing and directing “the” social movements, 
especially when protest against Morales’s policies flares 
up, to defend (with force, if needed) the current 
administration,5 these movements sometimes do not 
hesitate to put pressure on Morales to keep his promises 
(Zegada et al., 2008: 95-99), and even threaten that he 
“could suffer the same fate as his predecessor” (who was 
overthrown in June, 2005).6 Thus, the social movements 
behind MAS also embody the impulse that is “natural” to 
them: to push for their causes without worrying about the 
government’s problems and responsibilities. In fact, 
during the last three years, Morales has not always been 
pleased with the social movements’ actions. On several 
occasions, movements have rallied to defend the 
interests of, for instance, specific groups like the mining 
‘corporativos’, only to violently clash with the salaried 
miners – while both parties are supposedly supporters of 
Morales. Here, MAS had to mediate, and therefore give 
up the “simplicity” of struggling for “the obvious cause.” A 
similar thing occurred in various cases in which 
independent groups of miners had been ousted from their 
mineshafts by, comuneros, – rural community dwellers 
living on that territory and claiming territorial autonomy 
(one of the issues propagandized by MAS) – or when 
importers/sellers of used clothes brought in from Europe 
or the USA clashed with the owners of and workers at the 
workshops where national clothing is produced, and in 
whose favor the government finally decided in May 2009. 
Here, too, MAS found itself in a situation in which it saw it 
as its duty to mediate, to maintain peace, and to finally 
decide in favor of one or the other with “the national 
interest” in mind – precisely the situation a social 
movement never faces. Additionally, Morales’s cabinet 
was questioned by “the social movements” in early 2006, 
and again in March to April 2009 because it did not 
contain enough indigenous ministers.7 Arguably, MAS 
had in various cases decided to opt for experience and 
expertise rather than ethnic affinity and loyalty, something 
it would probably not have done had it still been a social 
movement claiming indigenous emancipation. COB 
challenged the MAS administration in May 2010, when it 
(albeit divided; the CSUTCB would not join in) rallied 
against a 5% wage increase proposed by the 
government. COB demanded substantially more, 
launched a march toward La Paz, and Morales, 
conspicuously, called upon the “responsibility” of the 
country’s workers. Rises in food prices and a delay in 
land-redistribution measures also triggered protests, 
which were sometimes harshly criticized by other 
supporters of Morales, fearing the weakening of his 
position, especially when such protests coincided with 
“sabotaging” tactics undertaken by the opposition. All  
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6
 see www.mrzine.monthlyreview.org/eb050206.html, 5-2-2006 
7
 In IAR-Noticias January 24, 2006, see www.iarnoticias.com. 
 
 
 
 
these protests were mounted by relatively poor, often 
indigenous, and habitually well-organized bands; that is, 
by social movements, and MAS did not always give in: It 
obviously cared about its image of being “fair,” of 
respecting the interests of private enterprises and the 
owners of private property, and of respecting the law and 
having the national interests in mind. In general, of 
course, the movements in the first and second circles 
mobilized less than those in the third circle and in the 
opposition movements. But still, an estrangement clearly 
emerged between the logics of “ordinary social 
movements” and the now-governing ‘former’ social 
movement. 
The ambivalence of MAS causes movements to 
oscillate between being allies and being opponents – 
depending on concrete issues, time-specific events, and 
tactical uncertainties. These mixed outcomes 
demonstrate the unsettled situation of social movements 
in Bolivia. Resuming the characteristics of the three main 
actors, the author conclude that the movements that 
oppose the government, which are mainly concentrated 
in the east of the country, best live up to what one would 
expect: They frame their differences with government 
measures, their identities, and their oppositional 
discourses, and they rally. They are social movements 
doing what one would suppose them to do. They oppose 
the incumbent administration, they struggle for their views 
and interests, and they are unconcerned about 
governability or their share in the safeguarding of 
democracy, the rule of law, and abiding by procedures 
and legal stipulations.  
The second actor – the whole of pro-Morales 
movements – had often proved willing to confront these 
demonstrations, violently if needed, and were astonished 
when the government would not immediately support and 
facilitate them. But in more tranquil times, they have 
oscillated between categorical support and incidental or 
regular protest. Most of the movements identify with the 
current government and its policies, but that does not 
mean they will always acquiesce. The social movements 
seem to be searching for their position and attitude in a 
situation in which they largely agree with the government 
in terms of contents, but in terms of position and “task” 
are in a completely different situation. Thus, they will not 
always fully identify with or even have empathy for the 
more compound position “their” governing emissary is in.  
Finally, in its discourses and in many of its actions and 
measures, MAS, the third actor, continues to struggle for 
its ideas and ideals (the ones it shares with its supporting 
social movements). However, it also attempts to co-opt 
these movements and is very unhappy whenever it fails 
to do so. Most importantly, when it assumed governance, 
it had to accept an extra responsibility that is at odds with 
its self-identification as a movement: It has to guarantee 
the rights of its opponents, its former adversaries. It has 
to abide by the rules, the legislation, the institution. It has 
to manage the state and the country, and this inevitably  
  
 
 
to it drifting away to a certain degree from the social 
movements that back and build it.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In the literature that reflects upon questions related to 
social movements and their success, most of the 
attention has been given to the factors that help explain 
this success. Some controversy is visible between 
authors who emphasize situational and environmental 
factors, and those who stress the importance of the 
intrinsic characteristics of the movements and/or their 
mutual alliances. The reconstruction of the case of the 
Bolivian emergence of a range of social movements and 
their amalgamation in MAS, suggests that the interaction 
between these two dimensions is the crucial factor. MAS 
developed the way it did both because of the nature of 
the grievances and issues brought forward by its 
“constitutive” social movements, because of its strategic 
decisions that were influenced by these movements, and 
because of its attempts to manifest itself as a credible 
alternative to the bankrupt party system that had been in 
place. 
In more theoretical debates, however, little attention 
had been paid to situations in which complete, or nearly 
complete, success really materialized. Only cases in 
which a military victory resulted in the annihilation and 
rebuilding of the state institutionality – as in Iran, 
Nicaragua, and Zimbabwe – have been analyzed. 
Attention to the concrete re-establishment of the 
relationships between social movements and the new 
government (allegedly backed by these movements) has, 
however, been central only in cases like the South 
African one. Here, most importance was given to the 
fierce criticisms the ANC’s first government received 
because it gave higher priority to economic growth and 
monetary “health,” than to the long overdue social debts 
(Weeks, 1999) and the widening gap between party 
officials and the rank and file (Lanegram, 1995; Zuern, 
2004). Not much work has been dedicated to situations in 
which a social movements’ representative and party 
became the hegemonic and governing force, or to what 
this does to the relationship between this representative 
and the gamut of (now less autonomous?) movements 
that support it.  
The Bolivian case suggests that the most important 
characteristic of such a configuration is a certain degree 
of division between the governing entity and the 
movements – not only because of the “moderation” of the 
first, but also because its change in position inevitably 
makes it drift away from social movement logics. There is 
an “intrinsic” difference between government and social 
movements, no matter how similar their political positions 
and priorities. This difference will always lead to a certain 
incomprehension among the social movements about the 
(their) government considerations and decisions, and it  
 
 
 
 
will, as suggested by the author in many cases also lead 
to the government attempting to co-opt and maintain the 
full loyalty of the movements, while facing a dilemma 
between prioritizing the fulfillment of the movements’ 
wish-list or prioritizing its status as an administration that 
is “stately,” despite its rebellious past. 
It also seems plausible that such a situation will always 
create insecurity for the social movements that support 
the new government. On the one hand, it is their 
government: They brought it there, and it has to do what 
was agreed. On the other hand, the government has to 
be a government for all: Treating all citizens equally and 
honoring general, “universal” rules. It has to give as much 
room to oppositional street demonstrations as to those 
organized by supporting movements. From the 
movements’ perspective, this is something that is difficult 
to comprehend. Nevertheless, it is inherent in the shift 
that the successful movement “envoy” goes through, 
particularly in cases in which democratic institutionality is 
upheld and even defended by all parties. Franz (2008: 
127-128) reminds us that any mature democracy needs 
the distinction between democratic participation on the 
one hand, and the rule of law, and the more “apolitical” 
state spheres, on the other; a “clear separation between 
the checks and balances aspect of the liberal state and 
the democratic component” (idem). For the supporting 
movements, their position and their “nature” make this 
difficult to appreciate. This is especially the case when 
(as in Bolivia) the “envoy” in its discourses continues to 
use the protest movement vernacular. Which is why, as a 
“movement among all the others,” MAS is a partner in an 
“instable coalition” (Mayorga, 2007). In that coalition, it 
cannot be denied, nor should it surprise anyone, that the 
pro-government rallies and demands met with a friendlier 
response than the oppositional ones. This reveals the 
difficult position the current polity is in: In terms of 
contents and of affinities, it partially overlaps with “its” 
social movements. But as polity, is has to do two, 
occasionally contradictory things: It has to realize a 
political program, and in this pursuit it finds a host of 
social movements on its side; but it also has to maintain 
and sustain “the state,” and as such is liable to warrant 
equal treatment for all citizens and their demonstrations. 
Although most observers (e.g., Organization of American 
States, Human Rights Watch) agree that the Morales 
administration in general complied with its responsibility 
to behave “stately” and “dignified,” it has also been under 
attack from the opposition for authoritarianism, 
patrimonialism, and nepotism and Franz (2008) pointed 
to the “fourth power” mentioned in the new constitution. 
The Morales government is very much in favor – at least 
verbally, but also in initial proposals for the new 
constitution – of giving far-reaching power to the social 
movements and/or the citizenry (the vague distinction 
between the two in government discourse being one 
reason for Barrios to worry): “the fourth power would 
exercise political and administrative control over the  
  
 
 
executive, legislative and judicial powers and (…) would 
stand above the classic powers since it was conceived as 
a power of the people” (Barrios, 2008: 136). Although in 
the final version of the new constitution, the idea was 
eventually watered down, the issue remains: When does 
a radical, highly participative, decentered, communal, and 
“direct” form of democracy (e.g., a key role for the social 
movements in governing) begin to threaten institutional 
equilibrium, and even the idea of equality in terms of 
opportunities for access to decision-making, and in terms 
of citizen guarantees? When does it begin to impinge 
upon the very idea of the state, because the latter is seen 
as something to be “captured” (idem: 129), “a space that 
can be evenly taken over, without proper consideration of 
how this might affect its specialized functions and 
dynamics”? (idem 132), and when does that begin to 
smother the space that society needs (and that the state 
ought to guarantee) in order to deliberate, to search for 
identities, and to protest? Bolivia is still in the process of 
constructing the equilibrium needed. The attempt by MAS 
to behave “institutional” and stately is entangled with its 
political program and with the social movements that 
support it. Evaluating the government’s success is 
difficult, because the political stance toward the current 
administration will often prevail in peoples’ views. 
However, according to a UNDP study (Aranibar, 2008), 
trust in and the legitimacy of democracy in Bolivia has 
increased since Morales assumed power, and although 
the director of Latinobarómetro8 and the UN High 
Commissioner on Human Rights hold the same opinion,9 
criticism persists (Molina, 2007). 
Bolivia’s situation is, of course, unique. But the sort of 
dilemmas that have surfaced in the country since MAS, 
which represents radically challenging social movements, 
won a landslide electoral victory twice in succession, are 
not. Any transition that is accompanied by institutional 
continuity will put the power-assuming entity in a 
quandary between its movement identity and its 
governance duties, will lead to irritation between the 
governing envoy and the movements, will create 
insecurity for these movements, and will result in fierce 
debates about democracy, the rule of law, and the rights 
of the defeated.  
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